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TAHOE'S REQUIEM: THE DEATH OF THE 
SCALlAN VIEW OF PROPERTY AND 
JUSTICE 
Laura S. Underkuffler* 
I. INTRODUCfiON 
In the two latest "takings" cases decided by the United 
States Supreme Court, 1 the string of recent victories by land-
owners against government seems to have come to an abrupt 
halt. Although Palazzolo v. Rhode Island2 and Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agenc/ 
were not unmitigated defeats for landowners, the Court's broad 
assumption in these cases that an ad hoc, balancing test should 
be used to resolve conflicting private and public claims in regula-
tory takings cases was certainly not what these landowners 
sought. 
Of course, the idea that an ad hoc, balancing test might be 
used in takings cases is not new. For many years this approach 
has remained a residual doctrinal category into which cases not 
covered by the Court's other, per se rules4 would fall. For in-
• Professor of Law, Duke University. I would like to thank Greg Alexander, Dan 
Cole, Thatcher Freund, Alon Hare!, Carol Rose, and Andr~ van der Walt for their com-
ments and suggestions. I would also like to thank the participants in the Second Annual 
Constitutional Theory Conference held at New York University, the Fourth Annual 
Public Law Conference held at Duke University, the Joint Program on Property Law and 
State and Local Government Law held during the 2003 AALS Conference, and work-
shops at University of Indiana-Indianapolis, Seton Hall University, and the University of 
Maine, where prior versions of this paper were presented. This research was supported 
by the Eugene T. Bost, Jr. Research Professorship of the Charles A. Cannon Charitable 
Trust No.3. 
I. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation"). 
2. 533 u.s. 606 (2001). 
3. 535 u.s. 302 (2002). 
4. Such per se categories include the permanent physical occupation of land, see, 
e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CAlV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), and the loss 
of all or substantially all economic value of land, see, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) and Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 606. 
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stance, in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York 
City/ the Court famously stated that a takings analysis involves 
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" which weigh "[t]he eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant" and the "char-
acter of the governmental action. "6 However, commentators 
have rightly sensed that the change wrought by Palazzolo and 
Tahoe is more than the simple return to prominence of a tradi-
tional idea. In Tahoe, in particular, the direct and emphatic na-
ture of the Court's underscoring of this test signals more. Tahoe 
signals, in some fundamental way, a shift in the way that prop-
erty rights and their protection are viewed. 
In this article, I shall explore what this shift is and why it has 
so deservedly caught our attention. I will argue that beginning in 
the early 1990s, and continuing for a decade thereafter, what I 
shall call the "Scalian view" of property and its protection domi-
nated Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. Under this doc-
trine, of which Justice Scalia was the principal architect,7 the 
idea of property is a concrete, objectively knowable, and immu-
table legal barrier which marks the boundary between protected 
individual interests and the permissible exercise of government 
power. If government transgresses this line, the individual is 
(almost always) deemed to have been wronged. And compensa-
tion is required, as a matter of "justice," under the takings 
clause. 
With the advent of Palazzolo and Tahoe, this doctrine col-
lapsed. I shall argue that after these cases, no longer will the idea 
of property be deemed to mark, with certainty, the point where 
protected individual interests end and collective power begins. 
No longer will the fact of individual loss-even significant indi-
vidual loss- necessarily compel the conclusion that a wrong has 
occurred. And no longer will justice, in takings disputes, be seen 
in only "compensatory" terms. 
The sudden collapse of the Scalian view might be seen as an 
abrupt or startling turn. In fact, I shall argue that its collapse was 
a very predictable product of the Court's prior takings jurispru-
dence. Neither the Scalian view's idea of property nor its con-
ception of justice could be sustained as the range of potential 
takings expanded and acknowledgment of the complexity of 
property conflicts grew. The very ideas that form the core of the 
5. 438 u.s. 104 (1978). 
6. ld. at 124. 
7. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. 
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Scalian view served to doom it, from the outset, as a viable ju-
ridical principle. 
The collapse of the Scalian view was thus an entirely inevi-
table outcome. It is also, I shall argue, an entirely welcome out-
come, in our effort to reassert sensible notions of takings and 
justice. 
II. VISIONS OF PROPERTY AND VISIONS OF JUSTICE: 
THE RISE OF THE 'SCALlAN VIEW'-AND ITS FALL 
In order to understand the changes that Palazzolo and Ta-
hoe represent, we must first sketch the competing visions of 
property and justice that shadow takings cases, and how one-
what I shall call the "Scalian view" -came to dominate the Su-
preme Court's approach to takings in the past decade. 
Two philosophically divergent understandings of property 
and its protection can be identified in our popular and legal cul-
ture. Under the first, or "conservative" vision, the protection of 
private property is championed, while under the second, or 
"progressive" vision, it is not. Property, as protected by law, is-
under the conservative vision-an individual's right to unfet-
tered possession, disposition, and use of land, chattels, or other 
corporeal or incorporeal things. It is the conservative project to 
protect property rights through legal and political strategies 
from collective predation or change. Under the progressive vi-
sion, on the other hand, there is nothing wrong with altering 
rights in property should collective goals demand it. For the pro-
gressive, the legal recognition of the protective force of property 
is contingent upon the absence of countervailing social interests. 
These characterizations are of course overdrawn to some 
degree. Those who adhere to the conservative vision do not 
deny, for instance, that previously recognized property rights 
must yield when confronted by particularly compelling public in-
terests such as human health or safety. And most progressives 
would admit, if pushed, that the idea of property as contingent 
and yielding is not, in fact, how they view property in many 
situations. For instance, their enthusiasm for the idea that wel-
fare benefits and public employment may be property8 and their 
8. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Louderrnill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (public em-
ployment) and Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (same); 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public assistance payments). 
730 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:727 
condemnation of the Poletown case9 were not driven by a phi-
losophical predilection toward the subordination of the individ-
ual to collective interests, or a vision of property that reflects 
that view. In the main, however, those who adhere to the pro-
gressive view have been far more open to the social contingency 
of property rights than have their conservative counterparts. 
Seen in broad brush strokes, the conservative viewpoint envi-
sions property as individually protective, separative, and auton-
omy enhancing, while the progressive sees it as contingent, yield-
ing, and dependent on social forces. 
The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment has functioned 
in many ways as the contemporary constitutional battleground 
for these competing visions of property. In most of the past three 
decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence, neither vision was 
clearly dominant. Conservative majorities often succeeded in as-
serting their view of property's protective ideal, and protected 
property owners' rights against development restrictions of land, 
physical invasions of land, restrictions on the occupation or de-
vise of land, and other actions by government. 10 Progressive Jus-
tices and their allies, on the other hand, upheld historic preserva-
tion laws, endangered species laws, zoning laws, anti-subsidence 
laws, and other social measures, even though those laws im-
paired what would be widely regarded as traditional property 
rights. 11 
The clear ascendency of a particularly strong form of the 
conservative vision in takings cases was marked by the Court's 
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council12 in 1992. 
This case dealt with a garden-variety, and therefore extremely 
important, question: whether ecologically based shoreline regu-
lations which prohibit further development constitute a "taking" 
of the landowner's "property." In an opinion that upheld the 
landowner's claims, Justice Scalia took the opportunity to en-
trench-as a philosophical matter, at least-a sweepingly con-
9. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 
1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (up-
holding the condemnation of a working class neighborhood for the construction of a 
General Motors assembly plant). 
10. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First Eng-
lish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Hodel 
v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Loretto v. Telepromter Manhatten CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419,419 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
11. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); 
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978). 
12. 505 u.s. 1003 (1992). 
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servative vision of takings and property. This "Scalian view," as 
assumed in Lucas and later cases, involves the following axioms: 
• Property is something that is concrete, that we can define 
and understand with precision. 
• Property protects the individual's interests from collective 
powers; that is its essential function. 
• The takings clause reflects these truths: it is simply an ex-
tension of this function. 
As a result of these axioms, in a takings case we must ask 
the following questions: 
• With what property did "owner x" begin? 
• What property does "owner x" have now? 
• Should "owner x" be compensated for this loss? 
-with this answer being "yes" unless the loss is too trivial; 
there are other benefits that "owner x" has reaped; or gov-
ernment has acted to protect (physical) human health or 
safety. 
This Scallan view has a great strength: it vindicates the idea 
of "property as protection" in which all of us, on some level, be-
lieve. In this view, property means the protection of our posses-
sions; it means the protection of our "expectations"; it means the 
protection of what our efforts, labor, good luck, cunning, and 
other circumstances have given us. The Scallan view's attempt to 
clearly, cleanly, and boldly vindicate this view has powerful in-
tuitive appeal. 
However, behind this structure many problems lurk. Any 
legally cognizable conception of property involves a theory of 
rights, applied to a particular conceptual space, protected with a 
particular stringency, and established at a particular time. 13 Be-
yond these general statements, however, the particular contours 
of "property" are far from obvious. For instance, what do the 
"right to use," "rights under state law," or "traditional rights" 
really mean? Is an individual's "property" the regulated land, 
the legally described parcel, the landowner's holdings, or some 
13. See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND 
POWER 16-33 (2003). 
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other idea? Should all "rights" that are "property" be protected 
with equal vigor, or should some be protected more strongly 
than others? Are the "rights" that comprise "property" those 
that existed at the moment of purchase, the moment of transfer, 
or some other moment in history? What of regulations that were 
authorized, but not yet issued? What of conditions that existed 
but were, at the moment chosen, not yet recognized? 
In the face of those questions, the Scalian view of property 
and takings remained undaunted. In Lucas/4 Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 15 Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation/ 6 Eastern En-
terprises v. Apfel,17 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes/8 and 
other cases, assumptions were simply made about the nature of 
protected individual interests. And once these assumptions were 
made, all that remained (as a practical matter) was the applica-
tion of a compensatory remedy. 
In 2001, however, a serious crack in this structure appeared. 
In Palazzolo, a landowner was precluded from developing his 
parcel in the manner that he wished by a state wetlands-
preservation law. 19 The most prominent issue was whether a 
landowner could challenge, as a taking, land use regulations that 
were already in place when he acquired the property. Most 
judges and commentators had rejected such claims on the 
ground that owners who took title with knowledge of limitations 
in place could not claim injury from lost value. Palazzolo re-
jected this analysis. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy as-
serted that the allowance of such claims was required by "the na-
ture of property."20 Property rights (in this view) are an abstract 
ideal, which the takings clause protects from impairment. It 
makes no difference whether this claim is asserted by the one · 
who owns the property when the regulation is imposed or by a 
later owner. Government cannot escape from a takings claim by 
reason of the sale or other transfer of the property. If a wrong 
has been done, the takings remedy is available not only to the 
person who holds title at that moment, but also to "[f]uture gen-
erations. "21 
14. 505 U.S. at 1003. 
15. 512 u.s. 374 (1994). 
16. 524 u.s. 156 (1998). 
17. 524 u.s. 498 (1998). 
18. 526 u.s. 687 (1999). 
19. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
20. ld. at 627. 
2 I. I d. 
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Up to this point, the case seems to be yet another triumph 
for the Scalian view of takings and property. We have a robust, 
compensatory takings guarantee for state interference with a 
concretely conceived and rigidly defined conception of property. 
Other elements in Justice Kennedy's opinion, however, left the 
situation oddly open-ended. "The right to improve property, of 
course, is subject to the reasonable exercise of state regulatory 
authority, including the enforcement of valid zoning and land-
use restrictions." The ultimate inquiry, he wrote, is whether a 
particular state action "is so unreasonable or onerous as to com-
pel compensation."22 To determine this question the state court 
should, on remand, "address ... the merits of petitioner's claim 
under Penn Central. "23 
The idea that the "onerousness" of government action 
might be dispositive in takings cases is in keeping with the 
Scalian view, since it makes what the claimant has lost the focus 
of the takings analysis. With the addition of the "reasonableness" 
of government action, however, comes a possibly very different 
inquiry. For instance, wetlands preservation laws that are "oner-
ous" may nonetheless be "reasonable," if conditions otherwise 
demand them. This seemingly broad formulation implies that 
other considerations or interests, especially public interests, can 
trump a property owner's otherwise legitimate complaint about 
a particularly onerous regulation. 
Indeed, the Court's endorsement of the Penn Central test 
reinforces this suggestion. Penn Central is a famous, pre-Scalian-
view case that advocated an ad hoc, balancing-of-interests ap-
proach to takings questions.24 Under this approach, it is not the 
property owner's interests alone that count in the takings calcu-
lation. 
Whether Palazzolo's majority opinion changed the assump-
tions behind takings law was the subject of dueling concurrences 
by Justices O'Connor and Scalia. In Justice O'Connor's view, 
"investment-backed expectations" -the idea which the Court 
had used in recent years to capture the sphere of protected indi-
vidual interests- are "not talismanic under Penn Central." 
Rather, "[e]valuation of the degree of interference with invest-
ment-backed expectations ... is [only] one factor" in a more 
complex calculation. In her view, "[t]he purposes served [by the 
22. /d. (emphasis added). 
23. /d. at 630. 
24. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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government action], as well as the effects produced, ... inform 
the takings analysis."25 Justice Scalia resisted such murkiness and 
insisted that the focus remain on the owner's loss of value. In-
deed, in his view, to allow government interests to swamp the 
property owner's loss "would [be to] ... giv[e] the malefactor 
the benefit of its malefaction."26 
If Palazzolo suggested a retreat from the Scallan view, the 
Court's opinion in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agenc/7 openly declared its aban-
donment. In Tahoe, the narrow question before the Court was 
"whether a moratorium on development imposed during the 
process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a 
per se taking of property requiring compensation. "28 On its face, 
the case seemed to present an ideal opportunity for yet another 
application of the Scallan view of takings and property. All de-
velopment of the petitioners' lakeshore lots was prohibited dur-
ing various moratoria, depriving petitioners, during those peri-
ods, of all reasonable economic value.29 In addition, the Court 
had previously held that temporary takings of all beneficial use 
of land were compensable.30 If the focus remained on the land-
owners' losses, the complete loss of use for a period of years 
seemed to present a strong case for compensation. 
Indeed, in their Supreme Court appeal, the landowners 
urged an analysis of the case that tracked the Scalian view of 
property and takings exactly. They contended that "the mere 
enactment of a temporary regulation that ... denies a property 
owner all viable economic use of her property gives rise to an 
unqualified constitutional obligation to compensate her for the 
25. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
26. I d. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
27. 535 u.s. 302 (2002). 
28. I d. at 306. 
29. The challenged prohibition on development lasted for at least 32 months, or as 
long as 6 years, in the views of various Justices. In the majority's view, the lower courts' 
rulings on the moratorium that was in effect from August 24, 1981, until August 26, 1983, 
and the one that was in effect from August 27, 1983 until April 25, 1984, were the only 
rulings encompassed within the Supreme Court's limited grant of certiorari. ld. at 306, 
313-14. The dissenters argued that the effects of the 1984 Regional Plan (which suc-
ceeded these moratoria) were properly before the Court as well. That Plan, which-in 
theory-permitted construction, was enjoined by the District Court as violative of Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency's own environmental standards. See id. at 312. In the dissent-
ers' view, the Agency was the "'moving force' behind petitioners' inability to develop 
[their) ... land" through 1987./d. at 346-47. 
30. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
u.s. 304 (1987). 
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value of its use during that period."31 Because the landowners 
had unquestionably borne a loss, in this sense, they argued that 
there was "no need to evaluate the landowners' investment-
backed expectations" more deeply, or to consider "the impor-
tance of the public interest served by the regulation. "32 
Surprising many observers, the Tahoe majority expressly re-
jected this invitation and concluded, instead, that the case was 
"best analyzed within the Penn Central framework." 33 In his ma-
jority opinion, Justice Stevens drew a sharp distinction between 
"physical takings" -such as those resulting from a condemnation 
proceeding or a physical appropriation-and "regulatory tak-
ings," which "prohibit a property owner from making certain 
uses of her ... property."3 The Court's jurisprudence "involving 
condemnations and physical takings is as old as the Republic" 
and involves, for the most part, "per se rules" of "straightfor-
ward application."35 Regulatory takings jurisprudence, by con-
trast, "is of more recent vintage and is characterized by 'essen-
tially ad hoc, factual inquiries,' . . . designed to allow 'careful 
examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances. "'36 
Although the landowner may clearly lose value as the result of 
regulation, that fact is not dispositive of the takings question. 
Rather, that loss must be evaluated in the context of the public 
program in which it occurs, and of that program's adjustment of 
economic burdens and benefits.37 
Quoting liberally from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in 
Palazzolo, Justice Stevens identified the principles set forth in 
Penn Central as the "polestar" in determining regulatory takings 
claims.38 "'The Takings Clause requires careful examination and 
weighing of all the relevant circumstances .... "'39 In this calcula-
tion, "'interference with ... investment-backed expectations'"-
that is, the landowner's loss-is only "'one of a number of fac-
tors that a court must examine."'40 Only if the regulation effects 
"the permanent 'obliteration of the value' of a fee simple estate" 
31. Tahoe·Sierra, 535 U.S. at 320. 
32. /d. 
33. /d. at 321. 
34. /d. at 321-22. 
35. /d. 
36. /d. at 322 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 
(O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
37. /d. at 324-25. 
38. /d. at 327 n.23. 
39. /d. (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
40. /d. (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
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is the landowner's loss dispositive of the takings question.41 Since 
the moratoria in Tahoe did not reach this extreme, they needed 
to be evaluated under the multi-factor, ad hoc, Penn Central test. 
In this and almost all cases, "the concepts of 'fairness and justice' 
that underlie the Takings Clause will be better served ... by a 
Penn Central inquiry into all of the relevant circumstances. "42 
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia 
and Thomas, forcefully advocated the Scalian view of takings 
and property. There is, the Chief Justice wrote, a "'practical 
equivalence' from the landowner's point of view" of the regula-
tions at issue in Tahoe and a physical appropriation.43 Under 
these circumstances, it is not plausible to assume that the regula-
tions "simply 'adjust[] the benefits and burdens of economic 
life"' or that the affected landowners receive any tangible bene-
fits from their operation.44 With clear evidence of the landown-
ers' loss, and no clear evidence of their offsetting benefit, the 
case for compensation was obvious. He argued that it is this ap-
proach- and not that of Penn Central- that is required by the 
Court's most recent cases. 
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist was undoubtedly correct 
that his approach is more in keeping with the spirit of Lucas and 
other Scalian-view decisions, the majority turned a deaf ear. In-
deed, after Tahoe it is apparent that Justice O'Connor has won 
the Palazzolo-concurrence battle. If there had been any prior 
doubt about the seriousness of the Court's embrace of Penn 
Central's ad hoc, balancing, broad-gauged approach in takings 
cases, there is no doubt now. No longer will the showing of a 
landowner's loss-even a significant loss-be sufficient, of itself, 
to compel compensation. After a decade of ascendency, the 
Scalian view of property and takings appears to be dead. 
Why did this happen? Was this simply the result of a shift in 
the philosophical winds, which might, in a few years, blow differ-
ently? Or are there deeper reasons-rooted in part, and ironi-
cally, in Justice Scalia's own actions-that made this outcome 
inevitable? 
41. /d. at 330. 
42. /d. at 334. 
43. /d. at 348 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
44. /d. at 349-50 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1017-18 (1992)). 
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III. THE DEATH OF THE SCALlAN VIEW-THREE 
REASONS 
737 
In this section, I shall argue that the Scalian view of prop-
erty and takings was doomed for three reasons. Those are: the 
Court's opinion in the Lucas case; the extension of takings pro-
tection to less tangible legal interests; and the problem of ac-
counting for justice in takings cases. 
A. THE LUCAS OPINION 
Treating the Court's opinion in Lucas as something that 
undermined the Scalian view of property and takings is obvi-
ously paradoxical. All would probably agree that if there has 
ever been any Justice on the Court who has believed in property 
as a concrete instrument for protecting individual interests, it is 
Justice Scalia, who authored that opinion. It was undoubtedly 
the intention of the Lucas opinion-which established yet an-
other, per se, compensatory takings rule-to shore up this con-
ception of property. Indeed, the Lucas case marks the clear as-
cendency in Supreme Court jurisprudence of the Scalian view of 
takings and property. 
In Lucas, however, Justice Scalia's doctrinal ambition in this 
regard ran afoul of another impulse: the desire to bring intellec-
tual rigor to the Court's takings jurisprudence. Given the oppor-
tunity to address the Court's takings jurisprudence in potentially 
historic terms, Justice Scalia apparently could not resist exposing 
the intellectual incoherence that riddled the Court's prior opin-
ions. 
Let us pause, for a moment, to consider these juxtaposed 
goals. The Scalian view of property and takings-in which indi-
viduals are strongly protected from government action, by com-
pensation for their economic injuries-depends upon individual 
property being something that we can concretely understand. If 
we are to afford strong, consistent remedies for government tak-
ings of individual property, we must know what that property is 
and how it has been impaired by government action. We must 
know the "property" with which "owner x" began; we must 
know the "property" with which "owner x" is left-with the dif-
ference between those values being the measure of just compen-
sation. 
Of course, as noted above, the certainty of such "findings" 
in the Court's decisions has been far more rhetorical than real. 
Indeed, the question of the "property" involved has generally 
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received superficial gloss, with the Court moving quickly to the 
issue of "taking."45 Consider, for instance, Dolan v. City of Ti-
gard,46 a recent and prominent case. In Dolan, the City of Ti-
gard, Oregon, attempted to condition the approval of a building 
permit upon the landowner's compliance with open space, land-
scaping, and alternative transit requirements. The question be-
fore the Court was whether this attempted "exaction" by the 
City "constituted an uncomgensated taking of ... property un-
der the Fifth Amendment." At various points, the Court alter-
nately implied that the "property" interest at stake was the right 
to exclude (which was sometimes portrayed as absolute in nature 
and sometimes not), the right to use, the entire parcel owned, or 
the narrow strip of land subject to the challenged regulation.48 
Problems of this sort have led a host of commentators to charac-
terize the Court's portrayals of property in takin~s cases as un-
explained, unexplored, and essentially incoherent. 
In Lucas, Justice Scalia was apparently determined to avoid 
the intellectual murkiness and sleights of hand that so often have 
plagued the Court's takings jurisprudence. Indeed, Lucas is re-
plete with references to an intention to confront previous pre-
varications and to shine the spotlight of incisive intellect into the 
dark comers of applied takings doctrine. Incoherent areas that 
seemed to have been noticed by everyone but the Court were 
suddenly, startlingly, and refreshingly acknowledged. For instance, 
in the course of his opinion, Justice Scalia: 
• acknowledged that the "conceptual severance" or "de-
nominator" problem in takings cases had not been con-
fronted by the Court. In determining the magnitude of the 
property owner's loss, one must know the "property inter-
est" against which the loss of value is to be measured. 
However, if (for instance) 90 percent of a tract of land must 
be left in its natural state, "it is unclear whether we would 
analyze the situation as one in which the owner has [lost all 
value in the restricted land] ... , or as one in which the 
45. See Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Propeny, IX 
CANADIAN J .L. & JURIS. 161, 165-66 (1996). 
46. 512 u.s. 374 (1994). 
47. /d. at 13. 
48. See id. at 384--87. 
49. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628 
(1988); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles (Pan 
1), 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1308-16 (1989); Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beerman, 
The Social Origins of Property, 6 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 217, 217 (1993); Underkuffler-
Freund, supra note 45, at 165-67. 
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owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract 
as a whole."50 
• acknowledged that the distinction between "harm-
preventing" and "benefit-conferring" regulations (with the 
former traditionally held to be a part of a property owner's 
"expectations" and the latter not) "is often in the eye of 
the beholder" and is "difficult, if not impossible, to discern 
on an objective, value-free basis."51 
• acknowledged that the problem in determining what "law" 
frames property rights is a difficult one. For instance, 
"background principles of nuisance and property law" may 
be "manipulable," and "[t]here is no doubt some leeway in 
a court's interpretation of what existing state law per-
mits."52 
739 
After frankly acknowledging these problems, Justice Scalia 
did not attempt to resolve them. Rather, he pushed them aside 
as he drove toward his conclusion. On the "conceptual sever-
ance" or "denominator" problem, he announced that "we avoid 
this difficulty in the present case, since the 'interest in land' that 
Lucas has pleaded (a fee simple interest) is an estate with a rich 
tradition of protection at common law."53 His response to the 
"harm-preventing"-"benefit-conferrinf problem was simply to 
jettison this as a valid consideration.5 On the question of what 
"law" frames property rights, he vaguely cited state "nuisance 
law," state "property law," and "existing rules and understand-
ings that stem from an independent source such as state law"55 -
potentially conflicting understandings. 
In the end, the question of adequate doctrinal reckoning 
with these problems was dwarfed in importance by the acknowl-
edgment of their presence. Once it is admitted that the Emperor 
has no clothes, it is far more difficult to take him seriously. The 
admission of these problems by the architect of the Scalian en-
terprise did not immediately doom it. Indeed, as described 
above, Lucas marks its clear ascendency. However, even as Lu-
cas struck a bold stroke for the Scalian view, it also undermined 
it. Belief in a rigidly protective view of takings law depends on 
50. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. 
51. !d. at 1024, 1026. 
52. !d. at 1030, 1032 n.18. 
53. !d. at 1016 n.7. 
54. !d. at 1024-26. 
55. !d. at 1030-31. 
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belief in the fiction of property's concreteness. Once Justice 
Scalia acknowledged the mythic nature of this image, the door 
was opened to more and more explicit challenges. 
B. "PROPERTY, PROPERTY EVERYWHERE": THE 
EASTERN ENTERPRISES AND PHILLIPS CASES 
Perhaps even more fatal to the old, concrete, unexamined 
idea of property were the Court's two, ar~uably most protective 
takings cases: Eastern Enterprises v. Apte/ 6 and Phillips v. Wash-
ington Legal Foundation ("IOLTA I"). 7 
These cases highlight a truth about takings cases that we 
must remember. Takings may involve more than land, chattels, 
and other traditional forms of property. Over the years, the right 
to vindicate one's "reasonable expectations,"58 the right to "an-
ticipated [commercial] gains,"59 the rights enumerated in an exe-
cuted contract,60 and the right to "economic advantages" "back[ed] 
by law"61 have been protected by the Court. Indeed, any individual 
interest created by law might be something on which the individ-
ual sufficiently relies, or to which the individual has sufficient 
claim, to be constitutionally cognizable property. It was the 
question of the limits, if any, to property's scope that Eastern En-
terprises and Phillips explored. Eastern Enterprises confronted a 
challenge to the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 
("Coal Act"),62 which stabilized funding for pension plans bene-
fitting the nation's retired miners. Under the Act, coal operators 
were assessed premiums to be paid to the plans, based upon 
their prior employment of miners now retired. Eastern was as-
signed the obligation to pay premiums for some 1,000 miners 
who had worked for the company before 1966, more than 
twenty-five years prior to the Coal Act's adoption. Eastern sued, 
claiming that the Act effected a taking of its property without 
compensation. 
In a series of prior decisions that spanned some thirty years, 
the Court had upheld similar social welfare legislation against 
56. 524 u.s. 498 (1998). 
57. 524 u.s. 156 (1998). 
58. E.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104,124-25 (1978). 
59. E.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51,64-66 (1979). 
60. E.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555,602 (1935). 
61. E.g., Kaiser Atena v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979); United States v. 
Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945). 
62. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1994 ed. and Supp. II). 
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employers' takings challenges.63 The Black Lung Benefits Act of 
197264 and the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 
198065 required employers to pay disability or pension compen-
sation to former employees or their survivors, despite the com-
panies' refusal to voluntarily undertake that obligation. With re-
spect to those statutes, the Court agreed that the legislatively 
imposed liability "constituted a permanent deprivation of assets" 
for social welfare purposes, but rejected the notion that it consti-
tuted an uncompensated taking prohibited by the Fifth Amend-
ment.66 Analysis in those cases began with recognition of the un-
questionably broad power of Congress to fashion economic 
legislation.6 "In the course of regulating commercial and other 
human affairs, Congress routinely creates burdens for some that 
directly benefit others."68 As a result, "legislation is not unlawful 
solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations."69 
In Eastern Enterprises, however, the Court's plurality opin-
ion took a sharply different tack. In the plurality's view, the Coal 
Act suffered from several constitutionally fatal defects. First, the 
financial burden that the Act imposed was not proportionate to 
the company's prior, voluntary undertaking. The industry's 
commitment to the funding of lifetime health benefits for retir-
ees and their family members occurred after Eastern had ceased 
its coal mining operations. The plurality observed: 
During the years in which Eastern employed miners, retire-
ment and health benefits were far less extensive ... , were un-
vested, and were fully subject to alteration or termination .... 
Although Eastern at one time employed Combined Fund 
beneficiaries that it has been assigned ... , the correlation be-
tween Eastern and its liability to the Combined Fund is tenu-
ous .... The company's obligations under the Act depend 
solely on its roster of employees some 30 to 50 years be-
fore ... , without any regard to responsibilities that Eastern 
accepted under any benefit plan the company itself adopted.70 
63. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); Pension Bene-
fit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984); Connolly v. Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construc-
tion Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993). 
64. 30 u.s.c. §§ 901-945 (2000). 
65. Pub. L. No. 96-364,94 Stat. 1208 (1980). 
66. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 222. 
67. See Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,528 (1998) (plurality opinion). 
68. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223. 
69. Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 526 (plurality opinion). 
70. /d. at 530-31. 
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Indeed, the plurality wrote, the Coal Act substantially inter-
fered with Eastern's "property" -its "reasonable investment-
backed expectations. "71 By imposing liability for employees em-
ployed many years ago, the Act attached "new legal conse-
quences" to a completed employment relationship.72 "'Retroac-
tive legislation ... presents problems of unfairness that are more 
serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it 
can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled 
transactions."'73 The retroactive operation of the Coal Act was 
apparent, since it "divest( ed] Eastern of property long after the 
compan~ believed its liabilities [to these employees were] ... 
settled." 4 Eastern had no notice from "the pattern of the Fed-
eral Government's involvement in the coal industry ... that life-
time health benefits might be guaranteed to retirees several decades 
later." 75 As a consequence, the Act effected a taking of property 
without compensation. 
Of course, the Black Lung Benefits Act-which the Court 
had previously upheld-a/so charged employers with the health 
care costs of employees, whom those employers had employed 
decades before. Liability for the disabilities of black lung disease 
was no more contemplated or accepted by those coal operators, 
than was the pension liability contemplated or accepted by East-
em. The plurality distinguished the Black Lung Benefits Act, 
however, on the ground that it "merely imposed 'liability for the 
effects of disabilities bred in the past,"' and was "'justified as a 
rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disabili-
ties to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor."'76 
"Likewise, Eastern might be responsible for employment-related 
health problems of all former employees whether or not the cost 
was foreseen at the time of employment ... :m "There is no 
doubt that many coal miners sacrificed their health on behalf of 
this country's industrial development," and that Congress could 
afford them relief as a matter of policy.78 The problem was that 
the solution that the Coal Act embodied imposed "such a dis-
proportionate and severely retroactive burden upon Eastern. "79 
71. /d. at 532. 
72. /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
73. /d. at 533 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992)). 
74. ld. at 534. 
75. /d. at 536. 
76. /d. (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)). 
77. /d. 
78. /d. 
79. /d. (emphasis added). 
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The idea that proportionate impact and retroactivity might 
be relevant to a due process challenge to legislation is not shock-
ing. Even notice and consent might conceivably be relevant as 
defenses to a charge that particular legislation violates particular 
individuals' due process rights. By framing this as a takings issue, 
however, the plurality opinion extends citizens' rights to a poten-
tially unimaginable degree. The "property interest" that the 
Court protected in this case was not Eastern's ability to retain its 
money; monetary liabilities to government for the ends of social 
welfare are ubiquitous, through taxation and other schemes. 
Rather, the "property interest" that Eastern was held to have is 
something far more: it is the right to be free of social welfare leg-
islation that upsets expectations, affects one disproportionately, 
or is imposed without consent. 
The potential reach of this holding is awe-inspiring. What 
piece of legislation does not upset expectations, affect some per-
son disproportionately, or cause financial loss without consent? 
Whether one considers tax legislation, agricultural regulations, 
import-export duties, consumer product safety legislation, bank-
ing regulations, welfare programs, school funding programs, or a 
myriad of other government acts, it is obvious that the hundreds 
or thousands of these enacted every year upset expectations, im-
pose liability on the basis of past relationships and actions, and 
disproportionately benefit some to the detriment of others. And 
never has the constitutionality of such laws hinged upon notice 
or consent. Do all citizens affected by such laws now have 
"property interests," protected by "takings" law? What, indeed, 
is the reach of the Eastern Enterprises rationale? 
The Justices of the Court were not unaware of the problem 
that the plurality's opinion created. Justice Kennedy, concurring 
in the judgment and dissenting in part, strenuously argued that 
the Act "must be invalidated as contrary to essential due rorocess 
principles," and not as a violation of the takings clause. 0 "The 
plurality opinion," he wrote, "would throw one of the most diffi-
cult and litigated areas of the law into confusion, subjecting 
States and municipalities to the potential of new and unforseen 
1 . . 81 c arms m vast amounts." "Property" for takings purposes must 
be understood more specifically and traditionally, he argued, 
"lest all government action be subjected to examination [as tak-
80. /d. at 539 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
8 I. !d. at 542. 
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ings] ... , with the attendant potential for money damages."82 
"The liability imposed on Eastern no doubt will reduce its net 
worth and its total value, but this can be said of any law which 
has an adverse economic effect. "83 Neither freedom from such 
impacts nor freedom from the laws that create them can be 
"property" that the takings clause protects. We cannot expand 
the scope of regulatory takings to include broad inquiries into 
what are essentially "normative considerations about the wis-
dom of government. "84 
Similar concerns were expressed by Justice Breyer's dissent, 
which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. "The 'pri-
vate property' upon which the [Takings] Clause traditionally has 
focused," he wrote, "is a specific interest in physical or intellec-
tual property." This case involves only "an ordinary liabili\Y to 
pay money, not to the Government, but to third parties. "8 "If 
the Clause applies when the government simply orders A to pay 
B, why does it not apply ... [to any] tax?"8 And why would it 
not apply "to some or to all statutes and rules that 'routinely 
creat(e] burdens for some that ... benefit others?'"87 
If Eastern Enterprises signaled a rush toward the finding of 
"property everywhere," Phillips ("JOLT A I") confirmed it. Phil-
lips involved a challenge to Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust 
Account (IOLTA) program, which was virtually identical to 
programs enacted in 48 other States and the District of Colum-
bia. Under this law, an attorney who received client funds was 
required to place them in a separate, interest-bearing, federally 
authorized ("IOLTA") bank account, upon determining that the 
funds '"could not reasonably be expected to earn interest for the 
client or [that] the interest which might be earned . . . is not 
likely to be sufficient to offset the cost of establishing and main-
taining'" a private, interest-bearing, non-IOLTA account.88 The 
interest that the IOLTA account generated was then paid to the 
Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation, which financed legal 
services for low-income persons. 
82. /d. at 543. 
83. /d. 
84. /d. at 545. 
85. /d. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
86. /d. at 556. 
87. /d. (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223 
(1986)). 
88. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 162 (1998) (quoting 
Texas IOLTA Rule 6). 
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This law was challenged by depositors of client funds, who 
claimed that it violated their rights under the takings clause. In 
Phillips, the question before the Court was a narrow one: 
whether "interest earned on client trust funds held by lawyers in 
JOLT A accounts [is] a property interest of the client or lawyer, 
cognizable under the ... Fifth Amendment."89 
The law of Texas, like most states, follows the general rule 
that "interest follows the principal." Thus, as a general matter, 
interest earned by a client's trust account funds is the property of 
the client. The twist in Phillips was that the client funds placed in 
IOLTA accounts were placed there because they would-on 
their own-generate no net interest. Held in a non-IOLTA ac-
count, these funds were too small in amount, and held for too 
brief a period, for any interest earned to offset the cost of estab-
lishing and maintaining the account, service charges, accounting 
costs, and tax reporting costs that the account would generate. In 
other words, the placing of these funds in IOLTA accounts de-
prived the claimants of zero dollars of economic value. 
This did not deter the Court. In a 5-4 decision, the Court 
held that the claimants nonetheless demonstrated a property in-
terest cognizable under the takings clause. Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that "[w]e have never held that 
a physical item is not 'propertt simply because it lacks a positive 
economic or market value." Indeed, "we [have] held that a 
property right was taken even when infringement of that right 
arguably increased the market value of the property at issue. "91 
Of course, Phillips involved no "physical item" in any traditional 
sense; at issue was interest that would not be earned, absent the 
challenged statutory scheme. This, however, made no difference. 
Although not deprived of property in that sense, the claimants 
were deprived of "possession, control, and disposition"- and the 
"confiscation" of these rights is an interference with "property" 
cognizable under the takings clause.92 
If Eastern Enterprises and Phillips are taken together, the 
potential scope of "takings" expands enormously. Any law that 
upsets expectations, imposes liability on the basis of prior rela-
tionships and actions, or disproportionately benefits some to the 
detriment of others, is now fair game. In addition, it is not even 
89. /d. at 164 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
90. /d. at 169. 
91. /d. at 170. 
92. /d. at 170, 171. 
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necessary that the claimant show economic injury-far more in-
tangible interests, such as "control" over government actions, 
are protected as well. Rights under "existing legislation"? Im-
munities for specific groups, that regulations create? Dispropor-
tionate impacts of local laws, or complaints about the use of tax 
money? There is no apparent intellectual barrier to "property" 
interests in any of these cases, and to resultant takings claims. 
As the scope of "property" expands, what the Court finds to 
be a "taking" of that property must contract. No complex society 
can adhere to a rule that makes it liable for every change in cir-
cumstance, disappointment, or frustration that every individual 
endures at government hands. Indeed, what the Court granted in 
"IOLTA I," it took away five years later. In Brown v. Legal 
Foundation of Washington ("IOLTA 11"),93 the Court faced the 
question not reached in Phillips: whether the constitutionally 
cognizable "property" that the Court had found to be at stake in 
Phillips was "taken" by the Washington State IOLTA scheme, 
in a way that the Fifth Amendment recognized.94 The Court held 
that it was not. What was the reason? The IOLTA scheme "had 
no adverse economic impact on petitioners and did not interfere 
with any investment-backed expectation."95 Since "the value of 
the petitioners' net loss was zero, the compensation that is due" 
was also zero.96 In short, without economic harm, there will not 
be (in the vast run of cases) a Fifth Amendment "taking" or a 
"right to compensation".97 
***** 
Under the Scalian view of property and takings, property is 
the (effectively) limiting concept, with a taking routinely found if 
property is impaired. With the specter of "property" interests 
created by virtually any statute, court decision, regulation, and 
expectation, this approach became untenable. No longer could 
the simple Scalian rule realistically provide its simple guarantee. 
While the expansionist ideas of property in Eastern Enterprises 
and Phillips may have cheered protectionist proponents, those 
same ideas worked-inevitably-toward the undermining of 
their ideal. 
93. 538 u.s. 216 (2003). 
94. See id. at 220. 
95. I d. at 234. 
96. I d. at 237. 
97. See id. at 234-40. 
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C. THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE 
The final and most fundamental reason for the ultimate de-
feat of the Scalian view of property and takings is found in an 
old idea: the need to account for justice in applying the takings 
clause. 
The conviction that justice is deeply involved in takings 
cases has lon~ been articulated by the Court. In Armstrong v. 
United States, decided more than forty years ago, the Court fa-
mously stated that the takings clause was "designed to bar Gov-
ernment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public 
as a whole. "99 Since Armstrong was written, this language has 
appeared in virtually every opinion that the Court has issued 
construing this clause.100 
The repeated invocation of "justice" and "fairness" in tak-
ings opinions, however, generally has been an awkward one. Al-
though justice is presented in these passages as the analytical 
lynchpin for these decisions, when the Court's actual reasoning 
is examined it seems to be largely an afterthought. 
Take, for instance, the Dolan101 case, which involved a tak-
ings challenge to "exactions" demanded by a city in exchange for 
the granting of a municipal building permit. In the first para-
graph of his analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
majority, repeated the Armstrong language and declared that the 
achievement of justice and fairness must guide the resolution of 
the case.102 Yet, in the ensuing and lengthy discussion of the is-
sues involved, neither justice nor fairness is mentioned again. In 
holding that the City of Tigard had failed to establish a sufficient 
factual basis for its permit conditions, the Court reasoned from 
various legal premises that were identified in the opinion. In this 
process, neither "justice" nor "fairness" nor its equivalent ap-
pears. 
This pattern is repeated in case after case. Although the 
question of "justice" or "fairness" is continually invoked as the 
central inquiry before the Court, it is rarely addressed in any 
98. 364 u.s. 40 (1960). 
99. I d. at 49. 
100. Accord, e.g., Oty of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 6tfl, 702 (1999); 
Nollan v. California Coastal Comrn'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978). 
101. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 12 U.S. 374 (1994). 
I 02. I d. at 384. 
748 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:727 
depth in the discussion that follows. Indeed, when we think of 
the mass of the Court's decisions in this field, it is difficult to ar-
ticulate how "justice" or "fairness" should be evaluated in these 
cases. Exactions are demanded by a city as the price for approval 
of a development proposal. Is this "just"? Is this "fair"? A de-
veloper's plans are thwarted by coastal wetlands regulations. Is 
this "just"? Is this "fair"? When we consider the Court's opin-
ions in this field, in the aggregate, there is little guidance on 
these issues. All sides claim the importance of justice, because it 
"feels right" and taps into our deep instinct that this must be the 
vital issue. Yet, after this acknowledgment, the question of "jus-
tice" or "fairness" is left unexplored, unexplained. 
The reason for this failure to grapple with the question of 
justice has been undoubtedly different for different members of 
the Court. For those who have adhered to the Scalian view of 
takings and property, the meaning of "justice" in this context 
was apparently so obvious that it needed no explanation. For 
those who have opposed the Scalian view, the understanding of 
justice that it entails-although apparently often assumed by 
these justices to be correct as well-sat uneasily with the ends 
they have wished to reach. As a result, "justice" has been, for 
them, something to be simply, quietly, and almost conspiratori-
ally ignored. Rather than rethink the question of justice, they 
have simply sidelined it. 
What is this Scalian notion of justice, that has been assumed 
so powerfully in this context? Let us again consider the Lucas 
case. In Lucas, the question was whether a state's prohibition of 
development of shorefront land, to preserve the beach/dune sys-
tem and prevent erosion, was a taking of property without com-
pensation. In his analysis of this question, Justice Scalia dis-
cussed how this law brought the landowner's glans "to an abrupt 
end," and severely impacted him financially. 1 He discussed how 
there might be situations, such as those involving zoning or other 
controls, when a complaining landowner gains from the chal-
lenged law-but that this was not such a case. He concluded, in 
brief, that Lucas should be saddled with such uncompensated 
loss only if the restriction should have been "expected" by him 
or "part of his title to begin with." 104 If neither was true, com-
pensation would be owed. 
103. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 100&-10 (1992). 
104. ld. at 1027. 
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What is most striking about this view of justice in takings is 
its completely one-sided character. Although the interests of the 
property owner are scrupulously considered, there is no consid-
eration of the interests of the state, or of those whom it repre-
sents. 
Indeed, it is fair to conclude that under the Scalian view, 
consideration of asserted public interests in the broad run of tak-
ings cases is not simply ignored- it is, in fact, illegitimate. In his 
concurrence in Palazzolo, for instance, Justice Scalia described 
the value that accrues to the public through wetlands preserva-
tion laws as "profit to the thief"105 A thief is, of course, someone 
who has- by definition- no legitimate interest to assert. In this 
view, we do not have parties with legitimate, dueling interests; 
we have one party with legitimate interests, and the other party 
with none. 
This view of the interests at stake is remarkable when we 
remember that the question of justice or fairness in law-on 
which takings cases are purported to depend-is an inherently 
relational inquiry. When we decide whether a law or its opera-
tion is "just," this is an inquiry about the advantages and disad-
vantages that "x" derives from the operation of that law, or its 
absence-and the advantages and disadvantages that are suf-
fered by "y". Indeed, when considering "justice" in law, we can-
not evaluate the claim of one party without reference to the 
other. Yet that is precisely what the Scalian view of justice in 
takings demands. It demands that we imagine the interests of 
one party-the takings claimant-and not the interests of the 
other. 
The reason for the single focus of the Scalian view is its as-
sumed, prior beliefs about the nature of the individual's claimed 
right and of the competing public interest. The Scalian view sees 
the individual landowner as a project pursuer, with a right to act, 
who is wronged by government action. Because the government 
"transgresses the side constraints constituted by [the individ-
ual's] rights," it becomes the individual's moral debtor. 106 The 
government must pay for the owner's loss. It is a question of 
compensatory justice. 
Public interests are eclipsed, in this view, because of its 
foundational assumption that the claimant is the victim, and the 
105. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,637 (2001) (emphasis added). 
106. See Loren E. Lomasky, Compensation and the Bounds of Rights, in NOMOS 
XXXIII: COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 13,24-26 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991). 
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government the aggressor. With the moral stakes thus drawn, the 
"justice" question is simple. It is how to rectify this wrong-not 
whether there is a wrong, in light of the merits of (or need for) 
the opposing public action. 
For those cases decided during the 1990s, when the Scalian 
view reigned, this view of justice was plausible. In this era, the 
typical case before the Court juxtaposed significant injury to 
property owners with relatively trivial public interests. For in-
stance, the local land-use concerns in Nollan, Dolan, and City of 
Monterey (such as ocean viewing, drainage concerns, vegetation 
concerns, and so on) were not of a kind that demanded a public 
dimension to "justice." Even Lucas, with its shoreline concerns, 
had little public impact by virtue of the "rare" facts presented. 
Seldom will a completely buildable lot be rendered "worthless," 
as the result of government regulation. 107 
If this view of the competing interests at stake was plausible 
in all of these cases, it was not in Palazzolo and Tahoe. The sim-
ple story in which the landowner is the "victim" and the public 
the "aggressor" is unconvincing when individual actions destroy 
thousands of acres of wetlands, or threaten a resource as valued 
as Lake Tahoe. In these cases, the loss of individual landowners' 
"rights" was viewed against the backdrop of a tremendous public 
loss if the Court were to adhere to the Scalian vision. Public in-
terests could no longer be ignored-and the simple scheme of 
"compensatory" justice for "victims" of government action be-
came suddenly and patently inadequate. 
In Palazzolo, the Court's majority hinted at the need for a 
more contextual and balanced approach to the ultimate takings 
question, which would include the consideration of public inter-
ests.108 In Tahoe, this change in focus was explicit. We are con-
cerned, Justice Stevens wrote, with a lake that is "uni~ely beauti-
ful, ... a national treasure that must be protected."1 Individual 
landowners' development actions, however, threatened the lake's 
pristine state and exceptional clarity. 110 '"[U]nless the process [of 
degradation] is stopped, the lake will lose its clarity and its 
trademark blue color, becoming green and opaque for all eter-
nity."'tt I 
107. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018. 
I 08. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627, 630; supra text accompanying notes 22-23. 
109. Tahoe v. Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 307 (2002) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
110. /d. 
111. /d. at 308 (quoting the district ccart's opinion). 
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Against the magnitude and gravity of this potential loss, in-
terference with the complaining landowners' claimed right to 
build rapidly paled in comparison. The "ultimate constitutional 
question," Justice Stevens wrote, "is whether the concepts of 
'fairness and justice' that underlie the Takings Clause" will be 
better served by a per se compensatory rule, or by a "'careful ex-
amination and weighing of all of the relevant circumstances."'112 
Building moratoria such as that imposed in the Tahoe case are 
used widely by land-use planners to preserve the status quo 
while they formulate a more permanent development strategy.113 
"The interest in facilitating informed decisionmaking by [such] 
regulatory agencies counsels against adopting a per se rule that 
would impose ... severe costs on their deliberations."114 Rather 
than assume that a compensatory obligation by government ex-
ists, we should use a careful, contextual, ad hoc approach in such 
cases.115 
The shift toward an idea that justice requires consideration 
of competing interests and competing claims is apparent 
throughout Justice Stevens's opinion. Although interference 
with a property owner's investment-backed expectations must be 
considered, it "'is Jonly] one of a number of factors that a court 
must examine."'11 Competing with the interests of the com-
plaining landowners in the Tahoe case are other public and pri-
vate interests that depend upon the lake's preservation. All of 
these interests must be considered if "justice and fairness"- the 
bottom-line inquiries-are to be achieved in regulatory takings 
cases.117 
The extent to which the majority veered from the Scallan 
path was not lost on the dissenters. Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
whom Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, argued that the case 
must be viewed "[f]rom the [complaining owners'] ... stand-
• "
118 s· 1 k f h · h pomt. mce va ue was ta en rom t e owners Wit no return, 
the case required compensation. Indeed, the dissenters' assump-
tion that the landowners' loss-and only the landowners' loss-
should be considered in such cases is graphically illustrated by 
the physical structure of the Chief Justice's opinion. In a para-
112. /d. at 334, 326 n. 23 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring)). 
113. /d. at 337-38. 
114. /d. at 339. 
115. /d. at 339-42. 
116. /d. at 326 n.23 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
117. /d. at 334-35. 
118. /d. at 349 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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graph at the very end of his opinion, set apart from the rest by 
three asterisks, he acknowledged that "Lake Tahoe is a national 
treasure(,] and I do not doubt that respondent's efforts at pre-
venting further degradation of the lake were made in good faith 
in furtherance of the public interest."119 However, these "ef-
forts," as the physical and symbolic separation of their descrip-
tion attests, are simply an afterthought. They are a touching 
story, perhaps- but of no palpable legal interest. 
To ignore the bilateral nature of justice in property cases is, 
in truth, the very deepest of ironies. Land-use disputes, of the 
kind that Tahoe, Palazzolo, Lucas, and like cases present, in-
volve competing property interests. 120 What these cases really in-
volve is the pitting of the interests of the complaining landown-
ers to develop their land against the property interests of other 
shoreline owners and users. It is difficult to see why the property 
interests of some should be exalted, and the same interests of 
others ignored, in a searching assessment of "justice." 
Indeed, more than other claims that are constitutionally 
based, property claims are so often-by their very nature-
unavoidably reciprocal in character. Freedom of speech, due 
process of law, freedom of religion, and other basic rights are-
in a sense- "public goods," which can (in theory, at least) be en-
joyed equally and freely by all, without cost to or deprivation of 
some by others. The character of property claims to physical, fi-
nite, nonshareable resources is necessarily the opposite. The 
claim of the takings claimant to unfettered control of land, chat-
tels, or other resources necessarily and inevitably denies the 
same claims to control asserted, through government, by others. 
In this situation, we do not have a simple "evil" done by gov-
ernment to the takings claimant: we have reciprocal "evils," 
done by reciprocal actors. 
By simultaneously stressing the importance of justice in tak-
ings and attempting to restrict its scope, the Scalian view is an 
inherently unstable concoction. It forces us to imagine justice, in 
takings, as half of the whole-the sound of one hand clapping. 
119. I d. at 354. 
120. See UNDERKOFFLER. supra note 13, at 94-102, 123-24 (describing how 
claimed property rights and competing public interests in cases of this type are grounded 
in very similar property·based interests and values). 
2004] TAHOE'S REQUIEM 
IV. CONCLUSION 
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With the decision in Lucas in 1992 and for almost ten years 
thereafter, the Scalian view of property and its protection domi-
nated Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. Under this vision, 
property provides a concrete, objectively knowable, and immu-
table legal barrier which marks the line between protected indi-
vidual interests and the exercise of collective power. If govern-
ment transgresses this line, the individual is almost always 
deemed to have been wronged. And compensation is required, 
as a matter of "compensatory" justice, under the takings clause. 
In the past few years, the hegemony enjoyed by this view 
has crumbled. After Palazzolo and Tahoe, no longer will the 
idea of property-itself-mark, with certainty, where protected 
individual interests end and collective power begins. No longer 
will the fact of individual loss, even significant individual loss, 
necessarily compel the conclusion that a wrong has occurred, or 
drive an award of compensation home. We must, instead, view 
individual losses in these cases in the social, economic, and po-
litical contexts in which they occur. We must "weigh all of the 
relevant circumstances." We must make ad hoc, normative 
judgments. We must consider how all affected persons should 
share the "benefits and burdens of economic life." 
The confidence with which I have declared the death of the 
Scalian view of takings is rooted less in a conviction about the 
constancy of Supreme Court jurisprudence, than in the conten-
tion that the ideas that form the core of the Scalian view doomed 
it from the start as a viable juridical principle. Its idea of prop-
erty as a concrete, pre-political, self-defining concept was inevi-
tably exposed as mythical. Its expansion-as "concretely" un-
derstood- to encompass virtually any reliance interest created 
by law inevitably proved to be impractical. And, as public costs 
loomed, its eclipse of public interests in the takings calculation 
could not, in the end, be reconciled with the idea of justice for all 
parties. 
The Scalian view of property and its function is, of course, 
not a completely fanciful or improbable one. Indeed, it can be 
seen, at its core, as a attempt to articulate a vision of property 
that all of us, on some level, share. The idea of property rights as 
fixed, unyielding, bounded, and protected responds to the deep 
insecurity that individuals feel in the face of the constant threat 
posed by collective power. If we are honest, we must admit that 
each of us believes in this idea for some objects, for some claims, 
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for some assurance that our own psychological needs will be re-
spected and our own acquisitive efforts rewarded. The Scalian 
view's bold attempt to guarantee the vindication of this idea has 
powerful appeal. Its assertion that the "takings" guarantee is 
simply an extension of this function seems, superficially at least, 
to be a natural one. 
The problem arises when this vision of property is pre-
sented as the sole and motivating idea for resolving takings is-
sues. Had the scope of American takings law remained what it 
was in the pre-Mahon121 era-had it remained concerned with 
"physical," as opposed to "regulatory" takings-the seeming 
equivalence of the idea of property and the outer boundaries of 
the permissible exercise of government power might have re-
mained unquestioned. If, for instance, we limited the scope of 
takings questions to the takings of title by government, or to 
physical occupation of land by government, the cases would be 
simple enough, and our notions of protected interests in these 
cases would be strong enough, that the conclusion that the idea 
of property "resolves" these takings issues would (coinciden-
tally) be true. 
But American takings law has not remained so limited. In-
stead, it has expanded to include regulatory takings, "intangi-
bles" takings, takings of every conceivable form and fashion. 
This expansion has defeated the simple equivalence of pre-
conceived notions of property and the permissible scope of gov-
ernment power. In these cases, we have no concrete, ready-made 
notions of property upon which to rely. Indeed, the idea of 
property as a concrete, fixed, and bounded entity cannot, by 
definition, be congruent with the idea of property as a poten-
tially unlimited field of individual reliance interests. As notions 
of "property" and "takings" expand, we must concede that we 
cannot resolve these claims without considering the competing 
claims of others. 
In a way, one might say, the Scalian view wanted too much. 
It wanted to maintain the image of property as clear, pre-
ordained, fixed, and bounded. It wanted to extend this image to 
ever more far-flung and intangible legal interests. And when, as 
a result of this enterprise, conflicts with other (public) interests 
mounted, it claimed exemption from a balancing of interests. Al-
though appealing in simple contexts, the Scalian view is, in the 
end, practically, legally, and philosophically impossible. 
121. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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The idea of property rights as fixed, unyielding, bounded, 
and protected is an emotionally important one for each of us. 
However, the gulf between this vision of property rights and 
their necessary institutional contingency is profound. Property's 
function, as a social and political institution, is the resolution of 
conflicting needs, visions, values, and histories. If we refuse to 
question the premise that the idea of property is, itself, determi-
native of these conflicts-if we refuse to acknowledge the com-
plex, interrelated, and allocative nature of property conflicts-
we will fail to account for the true costs of our actions, individu-
ally and collectively. We will fail to intelligently confront our 
choices. And we will fail to vindicate the ideal of justice, which 
takings jurisprudence has so stubbornly retained. 
